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Summary. ─ This paper explores the macroeconomic situation and medium-term perspectives 
of the South African economy. Three fully quantified and internally consistent scenarios are 
presented. The projections demonstrate that there is, indeed,  room to start addressing South 
Africa's pressing social needs in an effective manner, provided moderately optimistic 
assumptions about the future materialize. What is required is essentially an annual growth rate 
of at least 3% in combination with increasing imports, financed by access to foreign capital 
markets. Yet, if growth and real resource inflows falter, not even considerable moderation will 
be sufficient to maintain social and macroeconomic balance.  
  
 1. INTRODUCTION 
                                                 
*
The authors would like to express their gratitude to Stephen Gelb, Brian Kahn and Lance Taylor for stimulating 
discussions on the issues raised in this paper. The same accounts for the comments by participants in the Nordic 
Economist Workshop organized by Danida in August 1994. Responsibility for all errors of fact or judgement is 
ours. 
The development agenda facing the new South Africa is intricate. While the South 
African economy was dynamic during the 1950s and 1960s, stagnation and decline became 
characteristic from around 1970 together with swiftly increasing unemployment and high 
inflation (Gelb, 1991). The downturn continued after 1990, and although the current account 
stayed positive due to international financial sanctions imposed from 1985, the public sector 
deficit grew rapidly. Inflation fell and growth recovered somewhat in 1993. Yet, the upturn 
cannot be taken for granted. Apartheid was a deeply entrenched social and economic order. 
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Import-substituting policies were pursued for more than five decades to the benefit of the white 
minority, and human capital formation among African people was grossly neglected.  
As a result, South Africa has one of the most unequal income distributions in the world 
(Eckert, 1991), and also wealth and access to public services is extremely skewed. Moreover, the 
high income group is relatively large as compared to that of other developing countries,i so much 
less is left in relative terms to the poorer groups, many of whom live in the large informal sector. 
Thus, absolute poverty is appalling (COSATU, 1992), and complex restructuring will be required 
to bring about sustainable social development. However, unless redistribution and the 
satisfaction of basic human needs go hand in hand with renewed growth, the necessary increase 
in the purchasing power of the black population cannot take place without a drastic reduction in 
the living standard of the whites.  
The dual need for redistribution and growth is, in fact, no longer an issue in South 
Africa. Yet, perceptions regarding the respective roles of the private and public sector in 
development vary, ii  and the same accounts in relation to issues such as the promotion of 
international competitiveness and the maintenance of private sector confidence. These 
differences highlight that much can still go wrong in managing the reform process in South 
Africa, and it follows from the experiences of other developing countries that appropriate 
attention to macroeconomic constraints will be essential.iii Nevertheless, restraint cannot by itself 
restructure the economy and put South Africa on a higher, sustainable and socially just growth 
path.  
The objective of this article is to assess the broad macroeconomic confines within which 
future policy choices will have to be made in South Africa, and to provide a fully quantified 
input into the ongoing policy dialogue. Three scenarios, which capture the essential differences 
among the many possible directions the South African economy may take over the next six years, 
form the core of the analysis. The theoretical modeling framework is described in Section 2. 
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Subsequently a moderately optimistic baserun is outlined in Section 3. This scenario is used as 
benchmark in Section 4, where two alternative scenarios are presented, before the paper is 
concluded in Section 5. 
 
 2. MODELING FRAMEWORK 
During the past three decades, two widely used frameworks for macroeconomic analysis 
in developing countries have been the financial programming (FP) and the revised minimum 
standard model (RMSM), associated with respectively the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank (WB). These two models focus on short-term economic and financial 
stabilization in the tradition of the monetary approach to the balance of payments (MABOP), on 
the one hand, and medium to long-term growth, investment, savings and foreign resource inflows 
along two-gap lines of thinking, on the other. Thus, the two models, which trace their origins 
back to respectively Polak (1957) and Chenery and Strout (1966), are very different. They have 
in common, however, that they are both based on a very simplistic view of macroeconomics 
(Addison, 1989, and Edwards, 1989). Hence, the FP and RMSM models can be criticised from a 
number of different analytical perspectives (Tarp, 1993a). 
While the simplicity of the FP and RMSM models is a critical weakness, this 
characteristic is, at the same time, a strength. Policy debates are often clouded by unfamiliarity 
with fundamental macroeconomic questions and linkages. Accordingly, the application of 
rudimentary analytical frameworks can, if used judiciously, help policymakers and analysts gain 
a clearer understanding of key macroeconomic constraints and policy options. In this regard, the 
FP and RMSM frameworks can, first of all, serve as a practical organizing device. Moreover, the 
two models require few data to be run, and they are as demonstrated in Tarp and Brixen (1994) 
easy to apply and understand. In order to produce the macroeconomic scenarios presented in 
Section 3 and 4, it was therefore decided to use the formally merged version of the FP and 
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RMSM model presented in Khan et al. (1990),iv including a few modifications, which are not of 
any substantive nature. 
It is highlighted, however, that the merged model suffers from exactly the same 
shortcomings as the underlying FP and RMSM frameworks. Merging them adds nothing new in 
terms of theoretical insight, and to be meaningful in practice, the analysis must include additional 
qualitative and quantitative judgement from outside the model. This is so, in particular, since 
neither supply-side nor distributional issues are addressed explicitly. Consequently, due to the 
simple structure and extreme assumptions, on which the FP and RMSM are built, policy analysis 
based on marginal changes in the exogenous variables and parameters often end up being beside 
the point in the merged framework as pointed out by (Taylor, 1988, p. 154). Similar warnings 
against applying the merged model in a mechanistic manner have been made by Polak (1990). 
Yet, the two Bretton Woods institutions are set to play an important role in the policy dialogue in 
South Africa, and the merged model does contain the central monetary and material national 
accounting identities, which any macroeconomic projection model must include. 
A condensed version of the merged framework consisting of 18 equations is set out in 
the Appendix, which also contains a list of the 33 variables and 10 parameters. The model is 
divided into four sets of equations for respectively (i) the real sector, (ii) income effects from 
terms-of-trade adjustments, (iii) the balance of payments, and (iv) prices together with the 
monetary sector and government accounts.  
Growth in real GDP and aggregate exports are determined by exogenously given growth 
parameters, whereas total gross investments follow from a standard specification where the ratio 
of investments to GDP depend upon a constant and the GDP growth rate in the current period.v 
An aggregate import function makes import volume dependent on real output and the real rate of 
exchange. Nominal private sector consumption is specified as a fixed proportion of nominal 
disposable income, vi and the last equation of the real block is the material balance national 
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accounting identity. Gross national income is calculated by adding a terms-of-trade adjustment to 
gross domestic product. This adjustment is arrived at by deducting export quantity from the 
foreign currency value of exports deflated by the import price index. 
Turning to the balance of payments block, the current account balance identity implies 
that  the surplus on this account is equal to the sum of the trade balance, net factor income and 
net transfers received by the public and private sectors from abroad. An additional equation 
relates interest payments on external government debt explicitly to its size. Imposing the overall 
balance of payments identity on the system implies that the change in foreign reserves equal the 
sum of the current account surplus and net new foreign borrowing by the government and the 
private sector. 
The price level is determined as a weighted average of the domestic price level and the 
domestic currency price of imported goods. Subsequently the money market is described by four 
equations. Money demand is specified, first, as a fixed proportion of nominal GDP, where the 
proportionality factor is the velocity of money circulation. Since money is the only liability of the 
financial sector, it is by definition equal to the value of the assets of this sector, i.e., domestic 
credit and international reserves. It follows that the change in money supply equals the change in 
international reserves, valued at the current period exchange rate, and the change in credit 
extended to domestic sectors. An additional term accounts for valuation changes in the 
international reserves, resulting from exchange rate changes. A simple identity, which states that 
total domestic credit consists of credit granted to the private and the government sectors, comes 
third, and an equilibrium condition ensures, finally, that money demand always equals money 
supply. 
Considering the government sector next, its borrowing requirement is defined as the 
difference between expenditure and income. This constraint must be satisfied through foreign 
borrowing, by issuing bonds on the domestic market and/or by an increase in government 
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domestic credit.vii Accordingly, the budget constraint of the government can be rewritten as the 
sum of these three stock changes to complete the model, and it becomes evident that the merged 
framework is, indeed, a very simple applied economic model. Only three behavioural equations 
are specified, namely import, private consumption and money demand, in addition to equations 
linking output with investment and government foreign interest payments with external debt. 
 3. BASERUN 
To construct the moderately optimistic baserun and the two alternative scenarios 
presented in this paper, a complete 1992 macroeconomic base year data set, compiled from the 
1992 national accounts, published by the South African Reserve Bank.viii Subsequently, the 
modeling framework was programmed and implemented using the software GAMS (Brooke, 
Kendrick, and Meeraus, 1988). The 1992 data set made it possible to calibrate the parameters, so 
the model reproduces the South African economy in the base year and guarantees that 
specification errors are avoided. To obtain a unique model solution, 18 variables were defined as 
endogenous, before the model was solved for initial forecasts of the remaining variables and 
values of the parameters. In a next step, the values of the endogenous variables were reviewed. 
To the extent they did not appear reasonable, new forecasts of the exogenous variables and/or 
parameter values were made, and this process was repeated until acceptable values were obtained 
for all variables and parameters in every year of the forecasting horizon.  
The above procedure implies that all variables and parameters were, in fact, treated as 
endogenous in the final version of the scenarios presented here. Thus, the only strict constraints 
imposed were the different national accounting identities and definitions, which appear in the 
modeling framework, so the distinction between endogenous and exogenous variables is ignored 
in the following. Instead, focus is on the underlying assumptions, which result in the summary 
outcomes presented in Table 1, where the base year  appears as year 0. These data are therefore 
actual historical data, whereas  year 1 to year 6 covers the medium-term six-year forecasting 
  7 
horizon. 
 (a) Demand and Supply 
Projecting real output growth is complex in the South African case, for political  and 
economic reasons. Some improvement due to efficiency gains and a return to a more stable 
political environment can be expected. However, sustainable growth presuppose not only an 
increase in existing physical capital, but also investments in human resource development. By 
their very nature, such investments have a long gestation period. Moreover, while private sector 
confidence and investment can be expected to recuperate provided political stability prevails, 
recovery will undoubtedly be hesitant. In sum, to expect annual output growth in GDP around 
5% during the forecast period would be overoptimistic. Consequently, a more reasonable overall 
annual real growth rate of 3.0% was relied on. It was, in addition, assumed that this GDP growth 
level is reached after a two-year transition period, where GDP initially stays constant and 
subsequently grows by 1.5% in the second year. 
The GDP elasticity of imports is assumed to be 1.5 based on estimates in Kahn et al. 
(1992). Moreover, imports were increased during the first three years of the transition period to 
take account of existing involuntary import compression due to the financial sanctions. Real 
imports are, in sum, projected to grow with around 10% in the first year falling gradually to an 
annual level of 4.5%. As a share of GDP, imports increase from 19.5% in the base year to 25.4% 
at the end of the forecasting period. It cannot be expected that South Africa will be able to 
replicate the export performance of the Newly Industrializing Countries in the immediate future. 
It is unlikely that international markets will be buoyant in the short run, and South African trade 
policies are in need of a major overhaul. Rapid and substantial liberalization does not appear an 
attractive option given the stagnating nature of the economy and the high rate of unemployment. 
In other words, the process is bound to take time, so total export quantity was assumed to grow in 
parallel with real GDP. In the baserun, real exports therefore remain at 23.3% of GDP for the 
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whole of the period considered.  
Total investments need to be consistent with the annual growth forecast of 3%, so it was 
decided to put the incremental capital-output ratio at 1.5 for the whole of the projection period. 
This implies a stable aggregate investment level of 22.3% of GDP from the fourth year onwards, 
given the value of the constant term. ix Based on the path of government investments, to be 
further reviewed below, the above choices imply that private investments grow quickly from 
around 11.8% of GDP in the base year to 17.3% in the fourth year of the forecast period, staying 
at this level for the remaining three years.  
Real private consumption was determined on a residual basis. This is possible from the 
material balance equation since GDP, real imports and exports as well as investment (private and 
government) follow from the assumptions already made, and since government consumption will 
be determined based on the need to balance government finances. Consequently, the marginal 
propensity to save (consume) was set in such a way that consistency is ensured. This implies that 
private consumption is expected to fall in the first year by 1.8%  in real terms, recovering, 
however, already from the second year and reaching a level of 2.5% annual real increase in the 
final two years. The  resulting movements in the private sector saving propensity, including an 
increase in the initial years from 0.252 in the base year to 0.280 in the fourth year appears 
justified by the moderately optimistic assumptions underpinning the base run. Optimism is, in 
other words, reflected  in a restoration of private sector confidence and increased willingness to 
save and invest. 
 [Table 1 about here] 
 (b) Prices and Exchange Rates 
In constructing the baserun scenario, it was assumed that the Reserve Bank will manage 
its foreign reserves in such a way that the real exchange rate remains constant during the period 
under consideration. This seems a good reference point since it would appear that the rand is 
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neither seriously overvalued nor significantly undervalued. In addition, the domestic price level 
was set to grow by 10% on an annual basis. This is approximately the domestic inflation realized 
in the base year, and trying to opt for a lower rate of inflation does not seem warranted as this 
could affect the real economy adversely. 
Both import and export prices were assumed to grow by 5% on an annual basis, 
implying that terms of trade remain constant. It is certainly likely that some variation will appear 
in practice over the coming years, but constant terms of trade do appear a useful starting point for 
the analysis because of the inherent complexities of projecting the relevant price series. A 
constant real exchange rate and the assumed rates of inflation imply (i) an annual depreciation of 
the nominal exchange rate of 4.8%, and (ii) an annual rate of growth of 10% in the general price 
level.  
 (c) Asset Stocks 
With the assumed constant velocity of money circulation, the growth rate of nominal 
GDP translates directly into money demand. Thus, money demand and supply grows by 10.0 % 
and 11.6% in the first two years and by 13.3% on an annual basis from the third year onwards. It 
follows that the money stock as a share of GDP remains constant at the base year level of 58.8%. 
Developments in the stock of international reserves reflect that they are adjusted so as to be 
consistent with a constant real exchange rate. This implies that foreign reserves as a share of 
GDP grow from 3.3% in the base year to 6.4% in the last year, corresponding to respectively two 
and three months of imports. As such, the reserve level should be no cause for concern. 
With regard to domestic credit, it is assumed that credit extended to the private sector 
grows at approximately the same rate as nominal GDP in the medium term, but that its growth 
rate will lie below that of nominal GDP until the last year of the projection. The result is, on the 
one hand, that private credit as a percentage of GDP falls from 53.4% in the base year to a 
medium term level of 48.8%. On the other hand, private credit growth rates are larger than price 
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inflation already from the third year onwards, so a real increase in private credit is foreseen at an 
early stage. Government credit was determined on a residual basis. Accordingly, the assumptions 
made about international reserves and private sector credit result in a situation, where the stock 
of domestic credit extended to the government as a share of GDP reaches a maximum of 3.9% in 
the fourth and fifth year. This would seem an appropriate assumption given the recognition in 
South Africa of the undesirable inflationary consequences of too much monetization of fiscal 
deficits and the extraordinary large deficits during the last few years. 
As far as the stock of foreign debt is concerned, it was assumed that net government 
foreign debt will increase significantly in the whole period. Overall, the stock of government 
foreign debt increases its share of GDP from a level of 5.1% in the base year to 13.5% in the 
final year. South Africa is underborrowed, and the removal of sanctions will allow the 
government to borrow again in international financial markets. Hence, it would be sensible for 
the new government to make use of this avenue to relieve the foreign exchange constraint, 
provided the twin targets of growth and redistribution are kept in focus. In the construction of the 
baserun, it was, in addition, assumed that the stock of private sector foreign debt will increase 
from a level of 4.4% in the base year to 14.2% in the final year. The corresponding annual rate of 
growth in the stock of private foreign debt lies slightly above that of the public sector, but the 
profiles of the growth rates are assumed to be much the same, i.e., reflecting a moderately 
optimistic view, which can be expected to influence private as well as public capital flows in a 
decisive manner. 
Finally, the stock of government borrowing in domestic financial markets is assumed to 
grow at a rate of around 12.6% in all years. Consequently, the stock of government bonds 
remains between 37% and 38% of GDP in all years, as the economy grows and inflation 
decreases the real value of existing government domestic debt. The underlying behavioural 
assumption is that it is sensible to assume that the private sector will increase its government 
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bond stock more or less in line with real growth in the economy. 
 (d) Balance of Payments 
The surplus on the trade balance is in the baserun projected to disappear in the middle of 
the forecast period. Moreover, interest payments on foreign debt of the private sector and 
government increase from a level of 1.6% of GDP in the base year to 1.8% at the end of the 
period under study. It was moreover assumed that other factor payments and net transfers from 
abroad remain almost constant as a share of GDP at the base year level throughout the period. 
There is, based on for example the experience of Zimbabwe, good reason to be cautious in the 
assessment of the likely future developments in officials aid flows to South Africa, and given 
South Africa's high per capita GDP most aid flows will be on loan terms anyway. As such they 
are included in government net foreign borrowing. Consequently, the current account is projected 
to deteriorate steadily from a surplus of 1.2% of GDP in the base year to a deficit of slightly less 
than 5% of GDP at the end of the period. This should not give rise to particular concern, 
however, provided a sustainable growth path is established in the process.  
 (e) Government Accounts 
To address the economic and social legacies left behind by apartheid, fiscal policy is 
going to play a crucial role. Government will have to aim at implementing social reconstruction 
programmes, which imply a tangible social and economic up-lift of the African population. The 
centrality of fiscal policy is further highlighted by the fact that public debt grew significantly over 
the past few years of apartheid. Whereas the government borrowing requirement to GDP ratio 
was in the order of 1.5% at the beginning of the decade, the ratio had risen to 5.3% of GDP in the 
base year. 
The finance of the government deficit from the rest of the world through foreign debt 
accumulation was discussed above, and it is reiterated that the easening up of the external 
constraint is a most encouraging aspect of the future development outlook. Government deficit 
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finance from this source is therefore expected to increase from almost nothing in the base year to 
2.5% of GDP in the last year of the scenario. On the other hand, domestic credit is expected to 
contribute with a decreasing share of government deficit finance amounting to less that 0.2% of 
GDP in the last year. Finally, it is expected that the new government will be able to increase its 
borrowing in domestic financial markets corresponding to 4.2% of GDP in each year in the 
projection. In sum, total available credit from the three sources identified above would make it 
possible for the government to increase its budget deficit from 5.3% in the base year to  above 
7% in the middle of the time horizon from which it drops to 6.9% in the last year of the 
scenario.x 
As far as government revenue and expenditures are concerned, it was assumed that there 
is some - although limited - scope for increasing taxation as a share of GDP. This is, first, based 
on the view that measures to combat tax evasion can be introduced. Secondly, a capital gains tax 
is a possibility, and with regard to indirect taxes it should be feasible to implement a system of 
higher taxes for non-essentials and luxury consumer durables. Thus, tax revenue is estimated to 
increase from 26.7% in the base year to 30.0% in the final year, implying an annual growth rate 
of around 6.5% in real terms. Hence, given that the baserun is built around a growing economy, 
the increases in the tax rate and government revenue do not undermine real private consumption. 
Given the need to revive investment in physical and social infrastructure, it was decided 
to increase its share of GDP significantly. Accordingly, government investment grows rapidly 
from a level of 2.9% of GDP in the base year to 5.0% from the third year onwards. For the 
second half of the projection period, it was assumed that the growth rate of government 
investment follows the growth rate of GDP. Hence, government investment as a share of GDP 
remains constant. As far as other government expenditures and transfers to government from the 
rest of the world are concerned, they were fixed as percentages of GDP, and interest payments on 
foreign public debt were assumed to follow changes in the  government foreign debt, as already 
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discussed.  
The only remaining variable is government consumption, which was calculated on the 
basis of the given total government revenue (including transfers from abroad) in combination 
with the assumptions made about developments in investment and other government 
expenditures (including interest payment). The result of the baserun is that with the public 
investment programme expanding rapidly the room for enlarging recurrent government 
expenditures is rather constrained in the first three years of the scenario. In this period, real 
growth is only slightly above real growth in GDP. However, from the middle of the period, the 
annual real growth rate of government consumption reaches a level of 6.0%. Overall, the share of 
GDP increases from 20.8% in the base year to 23.0% in the final year. 
 
 4. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 
The baserun established in Section 3 demonstrates that the new South African 
government may well succeed in promoting growth as well as greater equity, if appropriate 
policy measures are taken. Even substantial increases in government social investments to the 
benefit of the disadvantaged group of the population do not appear in contradiction with the need 
to attain macrobalance. Yet, government expansion can certainly be pushed too far, and future 
prospects depend in a critical manner on how trade, aid and other international capital flows 
develop. This section therefore presents both an optimistic and a more pessimistic assessment of 
medium term perspectives. The two additional projections are asymmetrical in the sense that the 
changes in the relevant exogenous variables, parameters and policy instruments, which are 
summarized in Table 2, are not mirror images of each other. Thus, they tell two analytically 
different stories, with features which, as summarized in Table 3 and 4, are distinct from those of 
the baserun. 
 [Table 2 about here] 
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 (a) Optimistic scenario 
In the construction of the optimistic scenario, it was decided to add an extra percentage 
point to the level of growth in GDP, and such a growth performance is, indeed, feasible. If the 
new government manages to clarify remaining uncertainties regarding future economic policy 
and investment incentives in a convincing manner, the expectations of domestic and foreign 
investors can be influenced favourably. Hence, it is possible that direct foreign equity 
investments may speed up, while the risk of capital flight is at the same time minimized. It can, 
in this context, be noted that South Africa is well placed to benefit from the recent surge in 
international liquidity in search of profitable emerging markets. Such inflows, which can be 
substantial, could provide a welcome additional injection of foreign resources in the short to 
medium term. These capital account items are in the modeling framework used here captured 
through changes in the net foreign borrowing by the private sector, so this variable was adjusted 
upwards in the optimistic scenario, corresponding to an extra annual inflow of 1.4 billion US$. 
In parallel with the more favourable developments regarding private capital inflows, it 
was decided to increase export growth rates by half a percentage point a year and the level of 
government real investment and other government expenditures in nominal terms by an 
additional 1% per year. It was, moreover, assumed that government will increase taxes by 2.5% 
above the baserun in the first year of the optimistic projection, and that taxes in subsequent years 
follow a path which is around 1% above the baserun rates of growth. 
Widespread optimism and social stability is likely to have many other effects on the 
South Africa economy and the behaviour of economic agents. To capture some of these effects 
and smoothen out developments in the investment-consumption balances, the following three 
additional assumptions were made: (i) money velocity decreases by 1% a year as people are 
confident about the future and therefore willing to hold more monetary assets; (ii) the existing 
degree of under-utilization of installed capacity is brought down during the initial phase of the 
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forecast horizon, so the constant in the investment function can be decreased in the first three 
years; and (iii) the private sector saving propensity stabilizes at a slightly lower level towards the 
end of the forecast. 
Regarding nominal credit to the private sector, it was assumed that the South African 
government will find annual increases, which expand gradually from 1.5% to 4.0% above the 
corresponding levels in the baserun, acceptable. In this way, and taking account of the increase in 
the money stock due to the additions to the real growth of GDP and the slow down in the velocity 
of money circulation, the outcome as far as prices are concerned would be an annual inflation 
rate of 10%. Foreign reserves reflect as before that the real exchange rate is kept constant, so a 
substantial build-up of reserves is required in the beginning to sterilize the additional capital 
inflow. However, the annual additions to the reserve level gradually drop to 1.2 billion rand in 
the last year of the optimistic scenario, where the foreign reserve stock amounts to slightly more 
than three months of imports as was the case in the baserun. 
 (b) Pessimistic scenario 
The social fabric of South Africa has been threatened for decades. Large groups of the 
population have felt they had a better chance of survival in conditions of anarchy than in 
conditions of stability, so violence can easily erupt. This would delay badly needed investment 
and economic restructuring, paralyse the inflow of foreign investment and intensify capital flight. 
This, in turn, would further economic decline and lead to a collapse of import capacity, impairing 
economic recovery. Under such circumstances it will become difficult for the new government to 
picture the existing high expectations as being in a process of fulfilment. A more pessimistic 
scenario should not, therefore, be discarded a priori. 
Such a scenario would from a macroeconomic point of view undoubtedly involve a 
continuation or worsening of past economic trends in terms of growth. Consequently, a shift in 
the growth path amounting to a decrease in annual GDP real growth of one percentage point as 
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compared to the baserun was introduced. It was, moreover, decided to let government investment 
decrease by 1% a year as compared to the baserun, in line with the bleaker economic 
performance in terms of growth. Thus, the accumulated  shortfall in the last year of the 
pessimistic scenario grows to no less than 1.7% of GDP in constant prices. An annual drop in the 
export price index of 1% was added to illustrate the risk of deteriorating terms of trade. The 
potential negative influence from developments in the world economy might also include that 
South Africa would capture a diminished share of international capital liquidity. A decrease in 
net foreign borrowing by the government of 5% per year was, therefore, included. 
With economic performance below the level projected in the baserun, government will 
find it increasingly difficult to finance its activities. Issuance of government bonds is likely to be 
unattractive due to the detrimental effects this may have on the interest rate, as the willingness to 
hold bonds is likely to decrease in such a scenario. Thus, a 1% decrease a year in the stock of 
government bonds was included. On the other side, nominal taxes would have to be raised to 
counteract the higher annual rate of inflation of around 16%, which the pessimistic scenario 
implies. Hence, it was assumed that the government will choose to increase the level of taxes by 
1% a year.  
 [Table 3 and 4 about here] 
 (c) Results 
Total real investment is projected to increase in all of the scenarios presented in this 
paper, and the differences among them are largely explained by the deviations in terms of growth 
performance. Thus, investment expansion is particularly pronounced in the first three years, 
where the economy is shifted to a higher growth path, after which investment settles at a higher 
level with more limited annual increases. However, while the optimistic scenario involves a 
considerable additional expansion of real investment, reaching a level 12.7% above the baserun 
value in the last year of the projection, the pessimistic scenario is 11.9% below the baserun in the 
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same year. Real import growth rates are also positive in all the scenarios, but they naturally lie at 
relatively low levels in the pessimistic scenario. More constrained capital inflows in combination 
with the assumed export performance put, on the one side, a limit on available external finance, 
while the less satisfactory growth performance, on the other side, provokes a relative drop in 
import demand. 
Despite the increased need for investment to underpin the better growth performance of 
the optimistic scenario, there is in this case room for a further expansion of both private and 
government consumption. In fact, real private and government consumption in constant base year 
prices reach levels in the final year, which are 2.7% and 5.2% above their baserun values. Also in 
the pessimistic scenario, there is initially room for an expansion of government consumption. 
This initial boost is caused, however, by the more limited absolute expansion of investment due 
to the lower growth performance, in combination with a limited fall in imports as discussed 
below. Thus, already from the second year, real government consumption drops below both the 
levels of the baserun and the optimistic scenario, and in the final year is only 5.7% higher than in 
the base year. This is, indeed, not very much over a six-year period considering a population 
increase of around 2.6% a year.  
The overall implication for the resource balance is that South Africa will import less 
than what is exported for the whole of the time horizon studied here in the pessimistic scenario. 
However, the surplus gradually diminishes. In the baserun, the balance turns negative already in 
the third year, so the relatively more positive resource balance in the pessimistic scenario is in 
reality an imposed condition, which could ignite inherent social difficulties and conflict in South 
Africa. Hence, this indicator must be interpreted with great care. In the optimistic scenario, the 
resource balance turns negative already in the second year in response to the greater import 
demand and more favourable financing conditions. 
Turning to prices and the exchange rate, the real exchange rate remains as noted 
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constant, and the annual inflation rate is at 10% in both the baserun and the optimistic scenario. 
As far as the pessimistic scenario is concerned, it is assumed that the new government will have 
to finance a growing deficit by domestic credit expansion. If the government, in addition, wishes 
to maintain the extension of nominal credit to the private sector at the baserun level in nominal 
terms, the implication is that annual inflation will quickly increase to around 16%. Moreover, 
with the assumed rates of inflation in domestic and world prices and a relatively stable real 
exchange rate, the pessimistic scenario requires annual nominal devaluations above 10%. 
With the decrease of the velocity of money circulation, the growth in nominal GDP 
translates in the optimistic scenario into a money supply that increases from 58.8% of GDP in the 
base year to 62.5% in the final year, whereas it remains stable in the baserun. The real increase in 
the money supply in the pessimistic scenario amounts to only 7.7%, i.e., around half of the 
increase in the baserun and one-fourth the increase in the optimistic scenario. Taking account of 
the rates of inflation already referred to, real private credit expands from 179 billion rand in the 
base year to 187 billion in the final year of the baserun. In the optimistic scenario real private 
credit expands to 221 billion, whereas it contracts to 134 billion in the pessimistic scenario. As 
far as government credit is concerned, the public sector ends up with domestic credit constituting 
1.3% of GDP in the optimistic scenario, whereas it needs 15% of GDP in the last year of the 
pessimistic scenario. Together with the developments in the issuance of government bonds and 
net foreign borrowing by the government, this implies that total government debt as share of 
GDP grows from 44.1% in the base year to 54.3% in the final year of the baserun. The 
corresponding debt/GDP ratios in the final year of the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are  
49.3% and 52.1%, respectively. 
Despite the rather limited differences in the government debt/GDP indicator, the 
composition of the debt among the three available sources of finance is markedly different in the 
three scenarios. This reflects, inter alia, that the government is able to diminish its reliance on 
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domestic credit in the optimistic scenario, whereas the pessimistic scenario presumes that 
government will find itself forced to absorb a greater share of total domestic credit. Moreover, 
whereas government deficit finance increases from 5.3% to 6.9% of GDP in the baserun, the 
optimistic scenario provides the possibility of bringing the deficit down to 6.1% of GDP in the 
last year. In these two projections, the annual rates of growth of the nominal fiscal deficit also 
follow a distinct falling trend. In contrast, government deficit finance as a share of GDP quickly 
increases to around 8% in the pessimistic scenario. 
Finally, the initial surplus on the current account in the base year turns into a deficit 
already in the first year of the projections in all of the three scenarios. The relative easy access to 
foreign borrowing in the optimistic scenario is reflected in current account deficits, which reach a 
level of 5.9% of GDP in the last year of the optimistic scenario, while the baserun and 
pessimistic levels are projected to be around 4.9% and 4.1% of GDP, respectively. 
 
 5. CONCLUSIONS 
The debate on future economic policy and development strategy in South Africa has so 
far proven both controversial and complex. Nevertheless, the immediate economic issues to be 
addressed by the new government revolve around the possibilities for making the two objectives 
of growth and redistribution compatible. Fortunately, the economy is potentially very rich with a 
considerable human and physical infrastructure as well as a significant natural resource base, 
although gold might be a wasting asset. In addition, installed capacity is not fully utilised, and 
South Africa is, by any standard, under-borrowed.  
The medium-term baserun scenario, developed in Section 3, illustrates that under 
moderately optimistic assumptions it will be possible to implement a public investment 
programme amounting to 100 billion rands in 1992 prices over six years without disturbing 
macroeconomic balances excessively. This is on average equal to two-thirds more than the public 
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investment programme in the base year. Thus, there is certainly room to start addressing the 
needs of poor South African people directly. Furthermore, in the baserun scenario, private 
investment in constant prices is expected to increase from an annual 40 billion rand in the base 
year to more than 66 billion at the end of the six-year forecast horizon. This will provide 
additional job opportunities and possibilities for redistribution. 
Yet, the alternative scenarios established in Section 4 demonstrate that the medium term 
future can easily turn out differently. The optimistic and pessimistic scenarios represent, 
moreover, two analytically different perspectives. Whereas the difference between the optimistic 
scenario and the baserun can be characterized in an almost one-dimensional way, the comparison 
between the pessimistic scenario and the baserun is somewhat more complex. The optimistic 
scenario involves a higher growth path as well as an increased inflow of foreign resources. This 
inflow makes it, together with the increased domestic production, possible to expand both 
government and private consumption, and this expansion does not impair domestic 
macrobalances, including the budget position of the government and the rate of inflation. The 
good news, in addition, include that credit extended to the private sector grows in real terms. 
Hence, not only government, but also private investment can increase to a total, which in the 
final year in real terms lies more than 10 billion rand higher than in the baserun, implying a much 
desired additional  boost to growth and development. 
The pessimistic scenario, on the other hand, illustrates that if growth and real resource 
inflows falter, not even very considerable moderation will be sufficient to maintain domestic 
macrobalances. On the contrary, the government budget can easily reach an unsustainable level 
of well above 8% of GDP. Total government debt as share of GDP may fall below the baserun 
level, as the country is blocked from expanding its use of foreign capital; but this will, in turn, 
make government more dependent on domestic credit. Without growth, inflation bounces 
upwards, and this will squeeze real private credit, so not only government, but also private 
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investment fall. Even stricter fiscal and monetary restraint may quickly become necessary, and 
this could lead to a further critical worsening of the state of the economy. Hence, while there is 
reason to be optimistic, nothing can be taken for granted. South Africa will have to be on the 
outlook to avoid the dangers of the pessimistic scenario, while searching at the same time for a 
way to the baserun, or even better, the optimistic scenario. 
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 APPENDIX: MODEL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
A. Core equations for real sector 
 (1)    GDPt   =  (1 + γt ) * GDPt  - 1 
 (2)    X t  =  (1 + λ t ) * X t - 1  
 (3)    (IVPt  + IVGt ) /GDPt   =  κ0t + κ1t  * ((GDPt - GDPt  - 1 ) / GDPt ) 
 (4)    log (M t )  =  α0t + α1t * log (GDPt ) + α2t * log ( Et * MPI t  / PDt ) 
 (5)    Pt  * CPt   =  (1 - βt ) * (Pt  * GDYt - (TGt - GTt )) 
 (6)    (CPt + CGt )  =  GDPt - IVt - X t + M t 
 
B. Income effects from terms-of-trade 
 (7)    GDYt  = GDPt + TTADJ t 
 (8)    TTADJt  =  (X t  * XPI t / MPI t ) - X t 
 
C. Balance of payments - all variables in foreign currency 
 (9)    CURBAL t  =  (Xt  * XPI t  - M t * MPI t  ) + (NFPt - INTGt - INTPt ) + (NTRGt + NTRPt ) 
(10)   INTGt  = NFBGt  - 1 * IRt 
(11)   Rt - Rt  - 1  = CURBALt  + (NFBGt - NFBGt  - 1) + (NFBPt - NFBPt  - 1) 
 
D. Prices, monetary sector and government accounts 
(12)    Pt  =  (1 - θ) * PD t + θ * Et * MPI t 
(13)    MDt  =  (1/vt )* (Pt * GDPt ) 
(14)    MS t - MS t - 1  =  E t * (R t - R t - 1) + (DCt - DCt  - 1) + (Et - E t - 1 ) * R t - 1 
(15)    DC t  = DCGt  + DCPt 
(16)    MS t  = MDt 
(17)    BRGt  = Pt * CGt  + Pt * IVG t + GT t  + Et  * INTGt - TGt - Et * NTRGt 
(18)    BRGt  = Et * (NFBGt - NFBG t - 1) + (DCGt - DCG t - 1) + (GOBt - GOB t - 1 ) 
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Variables: 
BRGt  Government borrowing requirement 
CGt  Government consumption - constant 1992 prices 
CPt  Private sector consumption - constant 1992 prices 
CURBALt Current account surplus 
DCt  Total domestic credit 
DCGt  Government domestic credit 
DCPt  Private sector domestic credit 
Et  Nominal exchange rate - 1992 = 1.000 
GDPt  Real GDP - constant 1992 prices 
GDYt  Gross domestic income 
GOBt  Government domestic debt 
GTt  Other government expenditures 
INTGt  Government interest payments on foreign debt 
INTPt  Private interest payments on foreign debt 
IRt  Foreign interest rate 
IVGt  Government investments - constant 1992 prices 
IVPt  Private investments - constant 1992 prices 
Mt  Import quantity - constant 1992 prices 
MDt  Money demand 
MPI t  World import price index - 1992 = 1.000  
MSt  Money supply 
NFBGt Government foreign debt - foreign currency 
NFBPt Private foreign debt - foreign currency 
NFPt  Other factor services - foreign currency 
NTRGt Net transfer from rest-of world to government - foreign currency 
NTRPt Net transfer from rest-of-world to private sector - foreign currency 
Pt  General price index - 1992 = 1.000 
PDt  Domestic price index - 1992 = 1.000 
Rt  International reserves - foreign currency 
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TGt  Government revenue 
TTADJt Terms of trade adjustment 
X t  Export quantity - constant 1992 prices 
XPIt  World export price index - 1992 = 1.000 
 
Parameters: 
α0t  Constant in import function 
α1t  GDP elasticity of import 
α2t  Real exchange rate elasticity of import 
βt  Private sector saving propensity 
γt  GDP growth parameter 
κ0t  Constant in investment function 
κ1t  Incremental capital-output ratio 
λt  Export growth parameter 
vt  Money velocity 
θ  Weight in price index 
 
 
 Table 1.  Baserun - Key Variables 
 
 
                                                                                                       
Year                              0         1         2         3         4         5         6   Average(years 0-6 )  
  
 
                                                                                                             
 Material balance:                                 - Growth Rates in Per Cent -                                
                                                                                                             
 Private consumption                      -1.8       0.5       1.2       2.1       2.5       2.5          1.1 
 Public consumption                        0.8       1.7       3.5       6.0       6.0       6.0          4.0 
 Private investment                       18.7      11.8      11.3       6.8       3.0       3.0          9.0     
 Public investment                        23.4      21.2      19.8       3.0       3.0       3.0         11.8 
 Export                                    0.0       1.5       3.0       3.0       3.0       3.0          2.2     
 Import                                   10.1       8.8       7.6       6.0       4.5       4.5          6.9  
 GDP                                       0.0       1.5       3.0       3.0       3.0       3.0          2.2     
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                             
 Public Sector:                                          - Per Cent of GDP -                                    
                                                                                                             
 Budget surplus                 -5.3      -6.0      -6.6      -7.1      -7.2      -7.1      -6.9                 
                                                                                                             
    Domestic credit             -1.0      -0.9      -0.9      -0.7      -0.6      -0.5      -0.2                 
    Bond finance                -4.2      -4.2      -4.2      -4.2      -4.2      -4.2      -4.2                 
    Foreign borrowing           -0.1      -0.9      -1.5      -2.2      -2.4      -2.4      -2.5                 
                                                                                                             
 Public sector debt             44.1      46.4      48.4      50.1      51.7      53.2      54.3                
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                             
 Current account surplus         1.2      -0.8      -2.2      -3.3      -4.1      -4.5      -4.9 
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                             
                                                    - Growth Rates in Per Cent -                                
                                                                                                             
 General price index                      10.0      10.0      10.0      10.0      10.0      10.0         10.0 
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                             
 Nominal exchange rate                     4.8       4.8       4.8       4.8       4.8       4.8          4.8    
                                                                                                              
 Table 2.  Assumptions Underlying the Alternative Scenarios (Annual Change in Per Cent or Percentage Points as 
Compared to the Baserun)* 
  
 
Variable                       Optimistic Scenario    Pessimistic Scenario    
  
  
 
GDP growth rate                         +1.0                    -1.0 
 
Export growth rate                      +0.5                  No change 
 
Real government investment              +1.0                    -1.0 
 
Other gov. expenditures                 +1.0                  No change 
 
Government revenue                +2.5 first year               +1.0 
                                  +1.0 other years 
 
Government bonds                      No change                 -1.0 
 
Credit extended to                +1.5 first year  
   private sector                 increasing to 
                                  +4.0 last year              No change 
 
Money velocity                          -1.0                  No change 
 
Net foreign government 
   debt ($ terms)                     No change                 -5.0 
 
Net foreign private 
   debt ($ terms)                       +1.4†                  No change 
 
Export prices                         No change                 -1.0 
  
* The table indicates (unless otherwise noted) the number of percentage points which growth rates shift as compared 
to the baserun, and the annual per cent change in variables indicated by their level values. The latter changes are 
cumulative. In addition to the changes listed, the constant in the investment function and the private sector savings 
propensity were adjusted slightly downwards when constructing  the optimistic scenario. No changes were made in 
the investment constant, the savings propensity and foreign reserves in the pessimistic scenario as compared to their 
baserun values. The $/rand base year exchange rate used was 2.8516. 
†Annual increase in billion $. 
 Table 3.  Optimistic Scenario - Key Variables 
 
 
                                                                                                       
Year                              0         1         2         3         4         5         6   Average(years 0-6 )  
  
 
                                                                                                             
 Material balance:                                 - Growth Rates in Per Cent -                                
                                                                                                             
 Private consumption                      -1.3       1.5       2.2       3.2       3.6       3.6          2.1 
 Public consumption                        0.9       2.1       4.9       6.3       7.3       7.1          4.8 
 Private investment                       25.8      14.9      12.9       8.7       4.0       4.0         11.5     
 Public investment                        24.6      22.4      21.0       4.0       4.0       4.0         12.9 
 Export                                    0.5       2.0       3.5       3.5       3.5       3.5          2.7     
 Import                                   11.7      10.5       9.1       7.0       5.4       5.3          8.2  
 GDP                                       1.0       2.5       4.0       4.0       4.0       4.0          3.2     
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                             
 Public Sector:                                          - Per Cent of GDP -                                    
                                                                                                             
 Budget surplus                 -5.3      -5.5      -5.9      -6.4      -6.4      -6.3      -6.1                 
                                                                                                             
    Domestic credit             -1.0      -0.4      -0.3      -0.3      -0.1       0.0      -0.3                 
    Bond finance                -4.2      -4.2      -4.1      -4.1      -4.0      -4.0      -4.0                 
    Foreign borrowing           -0.1      -0.9      -1.5      -2.2      -2.3      -2.3      -2.4                 
                                                                                                             
 Public sector debt             44.1      45.4      46.4      47.3      48.1      48.8      49.3                
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                             
 Current account surplus         1.2      -0.9      -2.7      -3.9      -4.8      -5.4      -5.9 
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                             
                                                    - Growth Rates in Per Cent -                                
                                                                                                             
 General price index                      10.0      10.0      10.0      10.0      10.0      10.0         10.0 
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                             
 Nominal exchange rate                     4.8       4.7       4.8       5.3       5.4       5.5          5.1    
                                                                                                              
 Table 4.  Pessimistic Scenario - Key Variables 
 
 
                                                                                                       
Year                              0         1         2         3         4         5         6   Average(years 0-6 )  
  
 
                                                                                                             
 Material balance:                                 - Growth Rates in Per Cent -                                
                                                                                                             
 Private consumption                      -2.4      -0.1       0.7       1.6       2.2       2.3          0.7 
 Public consumption                        3.4      -2.0      -0.7       1.8       1.7       1.5          0.9 
 Private investment                       14.8      12.3      11.4       6.1       2.0       2.0          6.3     
 Public investment                        23.2      20.0      18.6       2.0       2.0       2.0         10.7 
 Export                                    0.0       1.5       3.0       3.0       3.0       3.0          2.2     
 Import                                    7.4       7.5       6.0       4.5       3.2       3.3          5.3  
 GDP                                      -1.0       0.5       2.0       2.0       2.0       2.0          1.2     
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                             
 Public Sector:                                          - Per Cent of GDP -                                    
                                                                                                             
 Budget surplus                 -5.3      -7.3      -7.8      -8.2      -8.3      -8.2      -8.0                 
                                                                                                             
    Domestic credit             -1.0      -3.0      -3.2      -3.3      -3.5      -3.7      -3.7                 
    Bond finance                -4.2      -3.7      -3.5      -3.3      -3.1      -2.9      -2.8                 
    Foreign borrowing           -0.1      -0.7      -1.1      -1.6      -1.7      -1.6      -1.5                 
                                                                                                             
 Public sector debt             44.1      46.3      48.0      49.3      50.5      51.5      52.1                
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                             
 Current account surplus         1.2      -0.5      -1.9      -2.8      -3.4      -3.8      -4.1 
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                             
                                                    - Growth Rates in Per Cent -                                
                                                                                                             
 General price index                      15.8      16.0      16.1      16.4      16.6      16.7         16.3 
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                             
 Nominal exchange rate                    11.4      10.2      10.6      10.7      10.8      10.8         10.8    
                                                                                                              
                                                 
  i. Depending on the precise definition of this group, it has a size of 20-30% of the total population in contrast to normally only a few percent. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
  ii. The ANC (1992) Policy Guidelines and the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), originally formulated by the ANC, on the one side, and the 
Normative Economic Model put out by the Central Economic Advisory Service (1993), on the other hand, are illustrations hereof. Tarp (1993b) can be consulted for further 
country background. 
  iii. Illuminating developing country cases are reviewed in Dornbusch and Edwards (1991) and Taylor (1993).  
  iv. This implies, inter alia, that the potentially conflicting policy advice, which emerges from implementing the FP and RMSM models independently of each other, is 
avoided. Other attempts at integrating the FP and RMSM frameworks include a study by Everaert et al. (1990), who present an expanded version of the RMSM called 
RMSM-X. The RMSM-X includes the external balance and savings-investment identities of the RMSM in addition to the fiscal and monetary identities of the FP model, but 
stops short of incorporating and specifying behavioural functions for the main macroeconomic variables such as private consumption and investment, money demand, export 
supply and import demand. While little published material is available, it is understood that such behavioural information will be included in the RMSM-XX models (Easterly 
et al., 1990).  For an extension of the original two-gap models to include a third fiscal gap, see the three-gap literature by Bacha (1990), Ndulu (1990) and Taylor (1989). 
  v. The functional form used here to determine total investments (i.e., the sum of private and public investment) differs from that in Addison (1989), but was chosen 
since it proved convenient to work with in model simulations. It is straightforward to show that the coefficient on GDP growth corresponds to the capital-output ratio, whereas 
the constant is approximately equal to the product of the physical depreciation rate and the capital-output ratio. 
  vi. The general price level is used in the estimation of nominal private consumption under the assumption that the GDP and private consumption deflators are identical 
  vii. Domestic debt finance is often not an option for governments in the developing world. In South Africa this source of finance is substantial. 
  viii. Tarp and Brixen (1994) contains detailed documentation of  the base year data. Complete documentation on the base run and the alternative scenarios presented in 
Section 3 and 4 is also available from the authors.  
  ix. In addition, the investment level was adjusted slightly downwards in the early years of the forecast period to account for excess capacity. 
  x. This is somewhat higher than the 6% limit, which it is understood was one of the IMF conditions in recent loan negotiations. 
